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Abstract. In most West European countries a quality control system for higher education is in 
a process of development. This article examines ome general characteristics of the emerging 
structures, how quality is defined and what impact his definition has on internal evaluation. 
On the basis of a more substantive conceptualization f the term quality, the current rend of 
a quality control system in which quality is predominantly defined from one central power centre 
is questioned. Important methodological nd substantive weaknesses inherent in this centralist 
model will be discussed. 
In the final section a shift towards aquality control system is advocated inwhich other interests 
and perspectives are taken into account. 
1. Introduction 1 
One of the current debates on the future of higher education veers between 
two alternative positions. On the one hand a higher education system, tightly 
controlled by the central government and on the other a market system in 
which competition amongst institutions and amongst students determines the 
structure of the system and the allocation of resources. 
Adherents of the latter position place institutional autonomy at the heart 
of their strategy. The less institutions are subject o governmental control, the 
more they can be reactive to their external environments. 
In this debate notions of "quality" and "performance" play a crucial role. 
Many national governments advocate more autonomy for institutions of 
higher education in order to operate more effectively with their environments 
and to enable them to meet new societal and industrial demands. Simulta- 
neously, governments have stressed the need for accountability and quality 
improvement of higher education and are consequently embarking upon a 
quality control system. This growing concern with quality control is considered 
to be a logical consequence of a reduction of governmental interference in the 
internal matters of both the university and the non-university sector. In 
France, for example, president Mitterrand in 1985 launched his committee for 
the evaluation of universities with the words: "L'6valuation objective des 
forces et des faiblesses des universit6s est le contreparte mSme, normale, de 
leur autonomic" (Perry, 1987, 345). 
Part of this autonomy is the acknowledgement that institutions of higher 
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education themselves are primarily responsible for the quality of their edu- 
cation. Some commentators, however, have argued that the present emphasis 
upon a quality control system and the concerning legislation constitute a
departure from all previous notions of institutional autonomy. For example, 
Neave has coined the term "conditional autonomy" to indicate that insti- 
tutions are free to develop initiatives, courses and research "on condition that 
they have first reached the stipulated or expected level of, say, graduate student 
output, or can show staffing ratios to be within national norms, etc." (Neave, 
1987, 122). In this context the definition of what constitutes "quality" appears 
less to be defined internally by educational institutions themselves and more 
externally, either by the government or by the establishment of co-agencies. 
This article deals with the tension between autonomy and external structures 
of quality control. In particular it attempts to give a theoretical ccount of the 
nature of the structures which currently emerge in several countries in Western 
Europe. Evidently, there are differences between countries, mainly due to 
historical and socio-political factors, which have to be taken into conside- 
ration. For example, differences with regard to the prevailing power structure 
within institutions and between institutions and the state. Or whether there 
exists a tradition with evaluation within the higher education system. Yet, from 
a macroperspective developments of external evaluation appear to be virtually 
interchangeable: the strengthening of the evaluation function by the govern- 
ment, the establishment of national evaluation committees, the inspectorate, 
the role of co-ordinating and planning bodies, as well as the search for quality 
standards and measures of institutional performance. 
In what follows the validity of these emerging structures will be examined. 
How is "quality" defined, what consequences can be expected and to what 
extent will the operational characteristics have an impact on internally develop- 
ed evaluation? 
Such a discussion may contribute to a formulation of more feasible and 
more effective strategies orientated to the improvement of quality in higher 
education in any particular situation. 
Before moving to this discussion the focus turns first to a discussion of the 
way the concept of quality can be conceived. 
2. A theoretical approach to quality 
It is remarkable that the increasing interest in enhancing quality in higher 
education has not kept pace with a better understanding of this concept. 
Quality has frequently been associated with the present need for more grad- 
uates in certain technological nd natural sciences, or a greater efficiency and 
effectiveness a a consequence of governmental cutbacks. Policy documents 
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mostly deal with questions concerning procedures, tasks and responsibilities 
of the respective agencies. Relatively little space is granted to a more substan- 
tive discussion of what quality of higher education is about. 
Ball, chairman of the British National Advisory Body (NAB) for example, 
applauds the increasing tendency to bring quality judgments in the planning 
process. Yet, he hastens to say that to try and define what quality is, is one 
of the most difficult ventures we might undertake (Ball, 1985, 97). The Dutch 
Council of Higher Vocational Education, while presenting lately far-reaching 
measures to restructure health education, went so far as to say that these were 
not based on quality judgment, as the council did not feel competent to do 
this. If quality will play a role in the planning process and ultimately might 
lead to important decisions, the need for a better conceptualization f the term 
"quality" cannot be ignored. 
One reason why the concept of quality is so difficult to grasp is that it is 
not possible to define it in a very straightforward way. As Pirsig (1974, 179) 
concludes, the concept is as elusive as it is pervasive. There are no clear-cut 
and single valued criteria or standards according to which quality can be 
measured. Not only does the assessment of quality of such an object like a 
work of art confront many professional critics with much difficulty, even the 
quality of an apple is subject o much disagreement: should it be juicy, sweet, 
unblemished? Other aspects are size, colour, consistency, storage-life, price 
and so on. No single characteristic will suffice and a final judgment is 
dependent on personal taste and on the purpose one has in mind. 
A first view of the matter is a common-sense one. Quality in education can 
be defined in terms of the goals which are to be accomplished. Only by 
acknowledging that institutions of higher education are goal-directed can a 
secure basis for assessing quality be found. More precisely, an institution or 
an educational program is conceived to have quality, if complete goal fulfill- 
ment is attained, not just an acceptable amount. Furthermore, a conception 
of quality is not restricted to the outcome. Process and input factors should 
be included as well. 
Process factors indicate the way the institution is attaining its goals. As 
Conrad and Blackburn ote, quality carries with it "a dimension of style, not 
just an outstanding accomplishment but the manner in which the accomplish- 
ment is achieved" (1985, 286). 
Input factors usually refer to resources necessary for institutions to carry 
out their functions: financial, qualified staff, technical and administrative 
equipment. The qualities of students an institution attracts belong also to this 
category. Some governments have questioned whether there is a link between 
resources and quality (Church, 1988, 34). For them quality is not just a matter 
of resources in themselves but of "how" they are used suggesting that process 
factors have a greater effect. Although it is acknowledged that recent eval- 
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uation literature stresses the importance of process factors, in the following 
conception of quality input factors will also be included. There is no reason 
to assume that quality control in higher education issomething different from 
quality control as it is practiced in industry which involves a specification of 
inputs, process monitoring, and end inspection of output (Church, 1988, 30). 
By including these factors in a definition of quality, the term encompasses 
other frequently used terms like efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency, 
according to Lindsay (1981, 690), refers to the question of how resources are 
used in the process and effectiveness is defined as the degree to which an 
institution realizes its goals (Etzioni, 1964). 
Because of this broad meaning of quality, critics have argued that only a 
holistic approach to the assessment of quality can be appropriate. Kuh for 
example believes that breaking out components hat are measurable vitiates 
the essence of the concept i self (Conrad and Blackburn, 1985,286). However, 
for our purposes to assess tructures of quality control from a macroperspec- 
tive, it is necessary tohandle the concept of quality in more operational terms. 
Therefore, a theoretical framework will be proposed in which goals of higher 
education can be understood and differentiated, without violating the com- 
plexity of quality. 
In order to arrive at such a framework it may be asked: "goals with respect 
to what?" Goals may refer to a particular course, an educational program, 
an institution or the higher education system as a whole. Goals on each of these 
levels do not necessarily coincide and may differ according to the perspective 
from which the goal will be considered. For example, a student may be very 
successful in a particular course, while at the same time the relevance of this 
course for the educational program can be judged differently. Similarly, a 
student in art history may have achieved first class exam results, but these 
results do not automatically give entry credentials to the labor market. From 
another perspective, an institution may concentrate on certain educational 
requirements, but at the same time neglect the relevance to societal needs. In 
each of these xamples goals have both an internal and an external dimension, 
depending on the level of analysis. Figure 1 contains an analytical framework 
in which a societal, an institutional nd an individual level are distinguished. 
In each cell some goals are indicated which appear quite frequently invarious 
publications on higher education. This overview of goals, however, is far from 
exhaustive. 
These goals which at first glance appear to be harmonious, can in fact be quite 
incongruent. Goals are ambiguous by nature. Ambiguities appear both 
between goals at the same level and between goals at different levels. To 
illustrate this, a few examples will suffice. At the individual level a variety of 
students' attitudes will come across. Some students will be focused principally 







9 the amount of education avail- 
able 
9 variety/diversity of the higher 
education system (university 
and non-university sector) 
9 availability of resources; finan- 
cial, material, personnel 
9 student entry qualifications and 
admission policy 
9 internal efficiency 
9 contribution of the educational 
program to the desired 
outcome (value-added) 
9 learning strategies and pro- 
cesses 
9 availability of course options, 
support and advice 
External 
9 relation between supply and 
demand of graduates 
9 value to the economy in terms 
of productivity and inter- 
national competitiveness 
9 scientific and socio-cultural 
function of higher education 
9 improving students' education- 
al and professional qualifi- 
cations 
9 development of independence 
of mind and moral autonomy 
9 institutional responsiveness to 
the external environment 
students' program in accor- 
dance with employer's needs 
acquiring extracurricular skills; 
organizational, communicative, 
sports 
Fig. 1. Framework for the classification of goals at three levels of analysis. 
their eyes on a more open and indeterminate future. Also, there will be a 
category of students who want to insure their future life by paying minimal 
premiums while enjoying their present. As a matter of fact the heterogeneity 
of the student population has increased considerably over the last ten years. 
At other levels goals cannot be pursued independently. The demands of 
students do not necessarily correspond with the educational program offered 
by the institution or faculty, neither with demands arising from the labour 
market. On the other hand, the sometimes problematic relationship between 
the need for vocational relevance and academic and scientific requirements 
contains a potential source of tensions (Squires, 1981, 16). 
In this framework goals are undifferentiated in terms of importance. There 
is no hierarchy that places more relevance on certain goals as necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions for educational quality. Any attempt o assess quality 
from one perspective unmistakably results in a partial conception of quality. 
Emphasis on one or just a few goals presupposes the relative importance of 
some goals and may consequently distort goal-attainment elsewhere in the 
framework. From a macroperspective all these levels have to be taken into 
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account if the balancing demands of quality are to be equally met. Popular 
slogans used in some circles of quality control ike quality being "fitness for 
purpose" or "fitness for use" do not recognize this multi-dimensional aspect 
of educational quality. 
Of course the question about whose responsibility it is to set such goals 
remains still to be answered. Which goals are going to be given greatest 
weight? Before dealing with this question, the quality control system as it 
actually appears to develop in some West European countries will be consider- 
ed. 
3. Current structures of quality control 
Although concern for quality in higher education is not new, the present 
emphasis given to the need for accountability has resulted in the establishment 
of comprehensive quality control systems throughout he western world. 
Consequently, many evaluation activities have become visible and the litera- 
ture on this topic has grown tremendously. 
Most of these systems have been broken down in two components, i.e. 
internal and external evaluation. First of all, it is generally acknowledged that 
institutions hould primarily be responsible for the quality of their education, 
their research and their other services. Evaluation activities initiated by and 
carried out by the institution or its substituent parts will presumably contribute 
to the improvement of educational quality. This internal evaluation iscomple- 
mented with external evaluation carried out by bodies or groups from without 
the institution: government, inspectorate, validation- or visiting bodies, peers, 
employers. 
Both internal and external evaluation are included as parts of an integrated 
quality control system. The relation between the two components has often 
been understood in terms of a cybernetic model. The evaluation by external 
groups are considered to be part of the higher education system and their 
regulatory function derives from being within the system. So Staropoli, the 
secretary of the French Comit6 National d'Evaluation, states that the aim of 
this committee is "less to wield permanent powers of balance or control than 
to try to develop the academic system's own capacities of evaluation, and 
hence to permit the whole system to regulate itself" (Staropoli, 1987, 126). 
Stated this way, external evaluation follows almost naturally from internal 
evaluation and tensions between both will likely be limited in scope. 
However, to characterize the system, further questions must be addressed 
concerning the nature and purpose of evaluation. What criteria will be used 
and why, who initiates the evaluation, who should make evaluative judgements 
and to whom should these be reported? 
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It is quite obvious that the present interest in evaluation is sustained by a 
number of forces, most notably by financial distress and by the need for 
accountability. Higher education should demonstrate publicly that resources 
are being used properly. In most West European countries which predominant- 
ly have a centralized higher education system, the government has assigned 
herself an important role in the process of quality control. This will briefly 
be illustrated in the light of the situation in the Netherlands. 
Since the 1986 University Education Act statutory regulations are provided 
regarding the ministerial supervision of the quality of education. The Higher 
Education Inspectorate has been introduced to undertake and coordinate 
evaluation activities. One of the tasks of the inspectorate is to organize visiting 
committees and to provide them with administrative support. Besides, the 
inspectorate has a complementary task to the work done by the visiting 
committees. That is, the content and methodology of evaluation carried out 
by these committees will come under the scrutiny of the inspectorate (apractice 
known as meta-evaluation). Moreover, the work of the visiting committees i  
not considered to be the only means of assessing quality. All methods and 
techniques of evaluation are at the inspectorate's disposal, though duplication 
of work will be avoided. Thus the inspectorate exercises control over the whole 
evaluation process. It will see all reports from lower levels, set conditions for 
course approval and generally oversee the monitoring schemes. 
Then, the findings of the inspectorate will be reported to the government. 
According to the governmental paper "Plan for Higher Education and Scienti- 
fic Research", better known as HOOP, the government "will ask the insti- 
tutions what conclusions they draw from the inspectorate's report and simulta- 
neously make clear what the conclusions of the minister are" (Ministerie van 
Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1988, 142). Stated this way, a linkage is empha- 
sized between evaluation activities and the information eeds of policy-makers 
who make decisions about financial resources of institutions. 
Some general characteristics of this quality control system, which is by no 
means exclusive to the Netherlands, can be recognized. First, evaluation iscarried 
on basically in a hierarchical way. The government dictates how the quality 
control process hould operate, assigns the tasks of the respective bodies in the 
process and steers on the basis of measurement. It is likely that the governmental 
definition of what quality is and how institutional performance should be 
assessed will weigh quite heavily (Maassen and Van Vught, 1988). This tends to 
become more and more a central regulation model of quality control. 
Second, primacy is given to external evaluation. The system is organized to 
meet demands of external control. How evaluation should be organized, the 
procedures, the criteria and norms are settled externally. Although internal 
and external evaluation are not necessarily opposed, external forces take a 
greater degree of control. 
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Third, evaluation is predominantly summative in nature. Evaluation is 
focused on measurement of the extent o which goals are attained (product- 
evaluation). The government has a big say in determining oals and establish- 
ing priorities between goals. The outcome will be defined accordingly. 
4. Criticism of the regulation model 
It is not surprising that the proposed quality control system has received much 
criticism. Much of this criticism has been raised about the detailed planning 
and control mechanisms which are considered as an expression of the tighter 
linkage between higher education and the state. Getting control over product- 
management matters will restrict the desired institutional autonomy to a 
considerable extent. 
In what follows I shall outline some methodological nd substantive weak- 
nesses of the regulation model. In particular, the implications of this model 
for the conception of quality advocated inthe previous ection will be consider- 
ed. What distortions are likely to occur between goals at different levels in the 
theoretical framework? 
Measurement and quantifiability 
Because of the accent on summative evaluation, a regulation model of quality 
control tends inherently to advocate xplicit goals for which there are readily 
apparent indicators available. Goals which are measurable will have a greater 
weight than those which are not. This frequent measuring can distort goals 
on other levels and "tends to encourage overproduction f highly measurable 
items and neglect of the less measurable ones" (Etzioni, 1964, 9). Even in the 
United States, where generally speaking a regulation model does not apply, 
the tide might turn. Among the five powerful trends that are consequently 
shaping American higher education, Ernest Boyer mentions the legislative 
demands for measuring the result. He fears that this will end up measuring 
all things except hose that matter most. He notes: "Standards of quality have 
focused on those aspects that are easiest to count. But these measures do not 
reveal what colleges and universities actually do" (Boyer, 1987, 11). Edu- 
cational programs eldom lend themselves tobeing measured by some quanti- 
tative outcomes. 
Furthermore, quantitative data are usually presented without much com- 
ment about their likely use, nor about their reliability and compilation. The 
Dutch inspectorate, for instance, has presented a list of over 20 items which 
are considered to be relevant to the definition of quality. The Inspectorate's 
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paper does not address the question regarding the ways in which these items 
are to be combined or against what yardsticks the items will be judged. 
Likewise, the Jarrett Report on Efficiency Studies in Universities (1985) 
suggested a series of performance indicators. As Ball and Halwachi (1987,399) 
have concluded, the report is quite unclear about which goals the proposed 
indicators are related to and there is little distinction between measures of input 
and output. It seems imply taken for granted that there exists a consensus on 
goals or at least one overriding oal. It can be questioned whether such an 
emphasis can do justice to the many different goals of higher education or can 
provide adecent measurement of he most important educational requirements 
(Bok, 1986). 
Relevance 
Another criticism concerns the relevance of data, the extent o which it is 
considered appropriate for judging quality. Some goals will be highly valued. 
Others are not because they are not embedded in the research methodology. 
This may lead to mistaken conclusions. Wright (1987, 14) for example criticizes 
the British government because the rate at which students drop out from 
courses without obtaining the originally envisaged (or another relevant) quali- 
fication is considered as a measure of quality. He shows that movement 
between courses and institutions, or patterns of intermittent s udy and move- 
ment between different modes of study are simply treated as cases of failure. 
Such movements, however, might in our framework appear as instances of 
success at the individual evel. Also, at the institutional level the student 
dropout rate may be acceptable or unacceptable, depending upon, for ex- 
ample, institutional policy regarding entry requirements (Yorke, 1987, 17). 
The student dropout rate will also be assessed ifferently from the perspective 
of the labour market. Employers often show more interests in the product of 
higher education - highly qualified manpower - and are often more concerned 
about entry and selection standards. Occasionally they express ome hostility 
to the less selective institutions (Fulton, 1984, 203). 
Furthermore, the underlying assumptions of indicators of quality may be 
questioned. Many of these indicators concern academic research and less 
teaching. The amount of research conducted by faculty, PhD completion and 
number of publications dominate on virtually all evaluation schemes. To what 
extent some of these indicators uch as the number of publications are to be 
considered as an adequate measurement of he quality of research can seriously 
be doubted. Moreover, the emphasis given to measure research output seems 
to suggest either that research is appraised more than teaching or that good 
research is associated with good teaching. However, this latter view can be 
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challenged and there is no evidence to support it. As Williams and Blackstone 
argue, it is hard to find "solid evidence of any substantial complementarity 
between the two and there are many arguments which are opposite to the 
assertion that teaching and research are intimately related" (1983, 84). In 
short, the presumed relevance of indicators outlined in governmental docu- 
ments is not well founded. 
Intended and unintended directions 
The development of a quality control system that is tied in with financial 
considerations implies that evaluation is placed within a particular framework 
of quality control. Programs are expected to meet he criteria of government 
effectiveness. Seen from a behavioral perspective, it is very understandable 
that internal evaluation will concentrate on those aspects of quality that are 
valued highest according to the governmental definition of quality. Put 
differently, evaluation shapes itself in the direction of the governmental 
definition of quality. 
This would not be a problem if the indicators used by the government 
correspond with a conception of quality on the three levels in the framework 
outlined before. However, emphasis on certain aspects of quality will have 
unintended orundesired implications for those aspects which are not included 
in the governmental approach to quality. For example, success-rates are very 
frequently applied as an indicator of quality. Consequently, it can be expected 
that faculty will be encouraged to direct their teaching towards successful 
completion of exams. Similarly, student credit hours are sometimes used as 
an indicator of instructional effort and serve as a basis for resource reallo- 
cation decisions. If this is the case, faculty and (faculty) administrators of units 
within the institution tend to adjust heir educational programs to generate 
more of them. Such strategies may run counter to the quality of the educational 
program. 
In the same way, the presumed relationship mentioned before between 
research and teaching may have deleterious consequences for the latter. As 
Elton notes, the fact that governmental bodies appraise research, but not 
teaching, isbeginning to result in a shift of effort in universities from teaching 
to research. Whether the result has been an improvement of research is 
doubtful, since most of the extra effort seems to have gone into chasing 
research funds (Elton, 1988, 382). The priority given to research above 
teaching supports the traditional value system which prevails in universities. 
In decisions about academic promotion and tenure, teaching qualifications are 
seldom required, whereas in primary and secondary education this is a stan- 
dard requirement. Those lowest in the academic hierarchy, frequently the less 
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experienced graduate students, are deployed to teach. In short, a predominant 
use of research indicators reveals the higher status given to research and implies 
that teaching will continue to be poorly endowed. 
As far as the societal level is concerned, a strong unilateral orientation of 
institutions towards the government might have implications for diversity and 
variety of the higher education system. This raises the problem of what 
Riesman, Trow, Clark, Birnbaum and others have referred to as "institutional 
homogenization". That is the increasing tendency for institutions to follow 
national rather than regional models. Most national evaluation committees 
and inspectorates are inclined to extend their investigations to what Staropoli 
calls "all public, scientific, cultural and professional institutions" (Staropoli, 
1987, 128). 
Although many governments, among them the Dutch government, have 
apparently maintained a binary policy as a crude guarantor of institutional 
diversity, quality control cuts across the categorial distinctions between the 
university and the non-university sector. However, more important questions 
are not addressed, which concern those of the possibly different (but not 
necessarily higher or lower) standards appropriate to different institutions, 
and of the range of activities that could or should make up a system of higher 
education (Moodie, 1988, 10). Here, a basic dilemma rises. A quality control 
system which requires certain uniform standards and measurements is contrary 
to the increasingly felt need for diversity in education, flexible responsiveness 
and a reasonable amount of institutional initiative and autonomy. This insti- 
tutional diversity is being threatened by imperatives built into the system which 
drives institutions in the direction of similar responses to common problems. 
Institutions tend to become more alike. 
5. Assessment of quality: within and without 
In the preceding section a regulation model of quality control has been 
criticized for several methodological reasons. These criticisms boil down to the 
fact that goals are mainly viewed from the governmental frame of reference. 
Quality is defined as meeting the governmental requirements and evaluation 
is consequently more oriented towards the control and decision-making pro- 
cess at the macro-level rather than towards the improvement of teaching and 
research. Quality control is predominantly carried out by means of centrally 
generated uniform standards which tend to function as yardsticks along which 
institutions or parts of it, are judged for purposes of funding or resource 
allocation. A focus on discipline-based valuation facilitates this process in 
which disciplines at different institutions can be compared and ranked, and 
provides a standard of performance which may or may not be achieved. 
Procedures are often mandated, in an effort to attain uniformity of outcomes. 
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Quality measurement with emphasis upon uniform standards as conceived 
in this regulation model also allows for a finer targeting of currently advocated 
systems of financial incentives, such as performance-funding and mission- 
budgets, to promote certain reforms and to achieve certain goals. Such a 
quality control system has explicitly political overtones. It is designed to yield 
conclusions about the worth of higher education and in doing so, is intended 
to affect he allocation of resources. Consequently, evaluation results enter the 
political arena. There, as Weiss (1987, 48) states, evaluative vidence of 
program outcomes has to compete for attention with other factors that carry 
weight in the political process and is subject to political opportunism. It is very 
doubtful whether on that level there exists an evaluation capacity, that is, the 
application of rational instruments on behalf of the planning and decision 
making process. 
It is clear, then, that a recognition of quality from one perspective may erode 
institutional autonomy to a considerable extent. Quality has become subject 
to much regulation. This takes on the status of a regulated industry of quality 
control. 
In avoiding these harmful consequences a major shift should be considered 
from a regulation model towards a quality control system which does more 
justice to the variety and complexity of the higher educational system. Such 
a system leaves room to a diversity of beliefs of various groups that are 
involved or associated with the institutions. 
A case for institutional autonomy arises from the starting point that insti- 
tutions have to decide to which goals they will give greatest weight. This implies 
that quality will be assessed specifically with reference to the goals of a 
particular institution or the target academic program. For the sake of 
maintaining diversity, not all institutions hould necessarily pursue the same 
goals. For instance, should an institution concentrate on those students who 
are most promising and responsive or should it have a more egalitarian 
dedication? Should an institution be focused on research or should it put quite 
explicitly undergraduate aching above research? 
Criteria should be developed with reference to these institutional goals. A 
criterion that "every lecturer should achieve a specified number of such 
publications each year" is not appropriate o assess the quality of an institution 
which emphasizes teaching goals. On the contrary, there are reasons why 
students might be better taught in institutions which are not distracted by 
claims that academic research is the main priority of their teachers. Similarly, 
laboratory equipment or the amount of copies of basic tests in the library 
should be judged in the context of particular goals. Thus, criteria for quality 
may vary according to the goal of a specific course, program or institution. 
The view that institutions hould be able to shape and pursue their own 
objectives implies that evaluation should be initiated as an internal process. 
69 
However, this does not exclude any necessity of external evaluation. On the 
contrary, without external evaluation there would be little internal evaluation 
or self-evaluation attempts to effect institutional improvement, as the Ameri- 
can experience teaches (Cook, 1988, 7). But this evaluation is not externally 
imposed by one outside agency, but is arranged by the institutions themselves. 
In such a model a specific sequence of internal followed by external 
evaluation exists which allows the institution time to meet or plan for the 
correction of deficiencies. According to Kells and Van Vught (1988) such an 
institution-centered model of quality control, in which ongoing collaborative 
studies and institutional self-study processes are the main elements, will be a 
guarantee for enhancing quality. 
The results of this internal evaluation should be externally validated and 
legitimized. Moreover, incentives from outside are necessary tomeet externally 
defined goals at both societal, institutional and individual level. For this 
purpose a system of accreditation or peer review may function. Furthermore, 
hearings may be held at which different groups can express their interests and 
assert their needs, which are not always mutually reconcilable. In such a 
situation the role of the government is limited to the encouragement of
immediate intrinsic mechanisms through which relevant groups may exert heir 
influence. 
Adherents of a regulation model often argue that government represents all 
interests equally well, including those of employers. However, a distinction 
should be made between efforts of institutions to show the government that 
they operate in accordance with employers' needs on the one hand and actual 
efforts to do so on the other hand. For example, Dutch universities have in 
recent years been eager to profit from financial incentives emanating from 
government, particularly in the sphere of information sciences. This has given 
the application and short-term activities a disproportionate amount of at- 
tention at the expense of scientific development. Although it is assumed that 
this development meets the demands and preferences of employers, the latter 
have on several occasions expressed their concern. Employers are recognizing 
the shortcomings of an excessive mphasis on narrow technical skills in 
employee development. As Lynton and Elman (1987, 112) state, "the larger 
corporations in particular are increasingly realizing that if they want their 
employees to have the insight and ability to weigh alternatives, then they need 
to provide a longer-range and broader educational approach". Recently a 
group of 35 representatives of Dutch industry unanimously came to the 
conclusion that: 
universities are responsible for their educational programs and should remain so. Simultaneously, 
they must take into account the wishes and needs of the labour market without following these 
blindly. Not only because the private sector is unable to specify its needs but mainly to prevent 
lack of variety. The private sector's wishes must be "weighed" against the universities' own tasks 
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and interests. This view appeared to be generally accepted during the conference (VSNU, 1988, 
4). 
In other words, institutions themselves have to make a careful determination 
of which tasks are appropriate to their general goals and which are not. 
Institutions are dealing with different environments and with different pro- 
cesses and strategies. This demands a quality control system which is more 
geared to these specific ircumstances. If judged in the light of our theoretical 
framework, such an approach permits variety, flexibility and willingness to 
innovate. As Williams and Blackstone have contended: 
Gross errors are more likely to be avoided, and the occasional brilliant insight made, when many 
different flowers are blooming. Error or misjudgement or inertia in some institutions may be more 
than compensated for by the benefits obtained from the successful ones (1983, 66). 
6. Concluding comments 
The principal thesis put forward in this article is that the quality control 
systems currently being developed in countries like the Netherlands, France 
and England tend in the direction of a model tightly controlled by the central 
government. It is argued here why a shift towards another, more intrinsic 
model of quality control is desirable. In such a model the quality of higher 
education is not judged in terms of criteria imposed from the outside by one 
centre of power. Rather, quality results from balancing the different interests 
and different perspectives of all those who have an interest in the quality of 
education. Consumers like students and employers of graduates are bound to 
have their own legitimate concerns. 
It can be expected that goals will be achieved at the societal, institutional 
and individual level. At the societal level more variety and flexibility will be 
maintained. At the institutional level, people within the institutions are encou- 
raged to enhance the quality of education. At the individual level students may 
assess the quality of teaching, a practice which is fairly uncommon i present 
higher education. Particularly where there are less curricular equirements, 
their influence may increase considerably. 
The integrity of the evaluator resides in providing insight into the interests 
and motivations of all actors within and without higher education and then 
doing a fair and balanced job of assessing the quality of higher education. In 




Special thanks are due to my colleagues Peter A. M. Maassen and Peter J. M. 
Weusthof for the development of several views put forward in this paper and 
to all those at the Forum who stimulated me with their comments. 
Note 
I. Revised version of a paper presented at the Tenth Forum of the European Association for 
Institutional Research, University of Bergen, Norway, August 1988. 
References 
Ball, Ch., Essays in Higher Education, The Society for Research into Higher Education & 
NFER-Nelson, Surrey, Guildford, 1985. 
Ball, R. & J. Halwachi, Performance indicators in higher education, in: Higher Education, 16, 
1987, 393-405. 
Barnett, R. A., The maintenance of quality in the public sector of UK higher education, in: Higher 
Education, 16, 1987, p. 279-301. 
Bergquist, W. H. & J. L. Armstrong, Planning Effectively for Educational Quality, Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, San Francisco, 1986. 
Birnbaum, R., Maintaining Diversity in Higher Education, Jossey-Bass, London, 1983. 
Bok, D., Higher Learning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986. 
Boyer, E. L., American higher education: the tide and the undertow, in: International Journal 
of Institutional Management in Higher Education, 1987, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 5-12. 
Conrad, C. F. & R. T. Blackburn, Program quality in higher education, in: Higher Education, 
Handbook of Theory and Practice, vol. 1, Agathon Press Inc., New York, 1985, p. 283-308. 
Cook, C. M., Internal and External Evaluation: Reflections on the American Experience, paper 
presented at the International Conference on Quality Assessment in Higher Education, 
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 1988. 
Church, C. H., The qualities of validation, in: Studies in Higher Education, vol. 13, no. l, 1988, 
p. 27-44. 
Elton, L., Accountability inhigher education: The danger of unintended consequences, in: Higher 
Education, 17, 1988, 377-391. 
Etzioni, A., Modern Organizations, London, Engelwood Cliffs, 1964. 
Fulton, O., Needs, expectations and responses: new pressures on higher education, in: Higher 
Education, 13, 1984, 193-223. 
Higher Education Inspectorate, paper delivered at the International Conference on Quality 
Assessment in Higher Education, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 1988. 
Kells, H. R. & F. A. van Vught, Theoretical nd practical aspects of a self-regulation a d quality 
control system for Dutch higher education, in: Tijdschrift voor Hoger Onderwijs, vol. 6, no. 
1, 1988, p. 15-21. 
Lynton, E. A. & S. E. Elman, New Priorities for the University, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987. 
Maassen, P. A. M. & F. A. van Vught, An intriguing Janushead, The two faces of the new 
governmental strategy towards higher education in the Netherlands, in: European Journal of 
Education, vol. 23, no. 1/2, 1988, p. 65-77. 
Ministerie van Onderwijs & Wetenschappen, Hoger Onderwijs en Onderzoekplan (HOOP), 
Zoetermeer, 1988. 
72 
Moodie, G. C., The debates about higher education quality in Britain and the USA, in: Studies 
in HigherEducation, vol. 13, no. 1, 1988, p. 5-12. 
Lindsay, A., Assessing institutional performance inhigher education: a managerial perspective, 
in: Higher Education, 10, 1981, p. 687-706. 
Neave, G., Editorial, in: European Journal of Education, vol. 22, no. 2, 1987, p. 121-123. 
Perry, P., Accountability and inspection i  higher education, in: Higher Education Quarterly, 
vol. 41, no. 4, 1987, p. 344-354. 
Pirsig, R. M., Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Corgi-books, 1974. 
Scheerens, J., Het Evaluerend Vermogen van Onderwijsorganisaties, Enschede, Rede Universiteit 
Twente, 1987. 
Squires, G., The Reform of Studies in Higher Education, OECD policies for higher education 
in the 80's, Paris, 1981. 
Staropoli, A., The Comit6 National d'Evaluation: preliminary results of a French experiment, 
in: European Journal of Education, vol. 22, hr. 2, 1987, p. 123-132. 
VSNU, Over Eerste-Fase Opgeleiden Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs, Samenvattend verslag van een 
werkconferentie, 1988. 
Weert, E. de, & P. J. M. Weusthof, Kwaliteit centraal gestuurd? Het kwaliteitsbewakingssysteem 
bezien vanuit een driedimensionaal perspectief, in: R. J. Bijleveld & R.J.G.M. Florax (eds.), 
Laissez-Faire in bet Hoger Onderwijs?, Lemma, 1988, p. 154-183. 
Weiss, C. H., Where politics and evaluation research meet, in: D. J. Palumbo (ed.), The Politics 
of Program Evaluation, Sage publication, Newbury Park, 1987, p. 47-72. 
Williams, G. & T. Blackstone, Response to Adversity, Society for research into higher education, 
Guildford, Surrey, 1983. 
Wright, P. W. G., Who Defines Quality in Higher Education? Reflections on the influence of 
professional power on conceptions of quality in English higher education. Paper presented at 
the Ninth European AIR-Forum, Enschede, The Netherlands, 1987. 
Yorke, D. M., Indicators of institutional chievement: some theoretical nd empirical conside- 
rations, in: Higher Education, 16, 1987, p. 3-20. 
